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Economic resources and the first child in Italy:  




At the turn of the twentieth century Italy registered a lowest-low fertility level, i.e., a 
total fertility rate of 1.26 children per woman in 2000. In this paper we investigate 
whether and how in that period economic resources and, in particular, income and job 
stability were linked with couples’ decisions to enter parenthood. With this aim, we use 
data from ECHP and carry out a longitudinal analysis on a sample of childless married 
couples to study the transition to their first child. Results show that the couples’ 
employment arrangement played some role in first child rates, with the single earner 
arrangement experiencing the highest first birth rates. We also find that employed 
women with labour income have much lower first birth rates than non-working women, 
while no evidence is found for male earnings and other sources of income. As concerns 
job instability, we find evidence that it was not significantly linked with the transition to 
first time parenthood during the investigated period. 
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1. Introduction 
At the end of the twentieth century Italy was characterized by important economic and 
demographic changes. Firstly, a large increase of educational attainment was observed. 
In 1995 the proportion of the population aged 25 to 64 that had completed at least upper 
secondary education was 27%, while in 2002 it was 34% (OECD 2004a). Young 
women in particular were the protagonists in this increased school attendance. In the 
meantime great labour market shifts were taking place. Women were significantly 
increasing their presence in the labour force, mainly due to the tertiarization of the 
Italian economy: female employment increased by 10.9% between 1995 and 2000 (Istat 
2000), so that the male breadwinner model was more and more challenged by the dual 
earner model. During this period part time jobs were increasing, especially among 
women: female part-time jobs
2 went from 18.4% in 1990 to 23.7% in 2001 (OECD 
2004b). However, part-time jobs in Italy were, and still are, rare in comparison with 
other European countries, and mostly characterized by short-term contracts and high 
precariousness. Moreover, working hours for part-timers were among the highest in 
Europe, while full-time working hours were the lowest.  
Since the turn of the century, the Italian labour market has become more flexible, 
because of part time jobs. On the other hand, increasing temporary and other fixed-term 
contracts have made it more precarious. The share of temporary employment
3 was 5% 
in 1990 and had doubled by 2000 (OECD 2002). The amount of temporary employment 
had increased since the early 1980s, when Italian governments introduced reforms to 
give greater flexibility to the labour market, making it easier to create temporary jobs, 
with a marked intensification of such efforts from the late 1990s. Fixed-term contracts 
and the use of temporary work agencies were liberalized, and these political reforms hit 
mainly young people and in particular women, because temporary jobs raised the 
incidence of transitions from unemployment to limited-duration jobs.  
In this context of transformations demographic behaviours have also changed. The 
prolonged investment in education and the long search for a stable job delay the family 
formation phases for young people. They are increasingly postponing leaving the 
parental home, an event that is closely associated with first union and is mostly 
coincident with marriage (Billari and Ongaro 1998).  
At the end of the last century women’s increasing presence in the labour market 
reshaped the gender relationship within couples and increased difficulties in reconciling 
work and family, with consequences for reproductive choices. At the beginning of the 
21
st century age at first marriage was very high: in 2001 it was 27.2 years for women 
 
2 Percentages are computed as part-time employment on the total employment. Part-time employment refers 
to persons who usually work less than 30 hours per week in their main job.  
3 Percentage of dependent employees in temporary jobs. Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 9 
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and 30.2 years for men. At the same time postponement of parenthood caused a rise of 
female mean age at the birth of the first child. This was 30 years in 2001, among the 
highest in Europe (Istat 2009a). Childbearing postponement is one of the elements 
causing the lowest-low fertility, which has been stable below the replacement level 
since the end of the 1970s (Billari 2005). Total Fertility Rate (TFR) has shown a slight 
increase since the middle 1990s - it was 1.19 in 1995 and 1.25 in 2001 (Istat 2009a) - 
due to the higher fertility of immigrant couples and a recovery among the youngest 
generations and more educated women.  
In this work we analyze the process leading to parenthood in Italy, and its 
interrelations with economic resources at the end of the twentieth century, focusing in 
particular on income and job stability. The link between economic resources and 
fertility is complex, since it embraces several key dimensions of the lives of individuals 
and societies (Baizan 2007). Although there have been many studies on the relation 
between female labour market participation and fertility in Italy (see, e.g., Del Boca 
2002; Ongaro and Salvini 2003; Vignoli and Salvini 2008; Salvini, Pasqual, and 
Vignoli 2009), to date there has been little investigation of the association of fertility 
with income (see, e.g., Giraldo, Mazzuco, and Michielin 2004; Rondinelli, Aassve, and 
Billari 2010; Santarelli 2010) and with job stability (Bernardi and Nazio 2001; Salvini 
and Ferro 2007). This is mostly due to a lack of suitable data for empirical analyses. In 
fact most demographic surveys in Italy have been weak on economic variables: in 
particular, information on income is typically missing. Proxies such as educational level 
or labour participation have been used, with the problem of confounding cultural and 
economic effects.  
Furthermore, dynamic studies at the micro level on the association between 
parenthood and economic resources in Italy are scarce, because of the lack of data. For 
this, panel data with a long time dimension or retrospective surveys with complete 
employment and fertility histories are needed. Since it is difficult to collect reliable 
objective data such as income at a much later date, the choice of a prospective survey is 
usually considered the best means (Duncan and Kalton 1987).  
In this paper we analyze data from the European Community Household Panel 
(ECHP), which is the panel with the longest duration currently available in Italy and 
provides information on the economic and reproductive histories of individuals. This 
paper represents a significant contribution to the literature on economic circumstances 
and fertility in Italy, both for its focus and for the data source used.  
In line with Liefbroer and de Jong Gierveld (1996), we believe that fertility models 
which include only women’s plans are mis-specified, and that asking women about 
their partners could cause bias estimates. For this reason we analyse data collected from 
both partners, and observe the interactions of their labour force status to see how they 
shape their fertility choices. Although most theoretical analyses emphasise that the Santarelli: Economic resources and the first child in Italy: A focus on income and job stability 
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fertility and labour force features of both partners are closely related (Oppenheimer 
1994), the Italian experience of studies on couples has been occasional and not 
systematic (e.g., Sabbadini and Rosina 2007; Vignoli and Salvini 2008), because of the 
shortage of data on men. Hence, a further strength of this paper is the analysis at 
couple-level that provides insight into the interconnections between partners’ working 
careers and childbearing choices.  
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review the theoretical 
background on which the work is based. In section 3 we describe the main features of 
the Italian setting, with a focus on the main characteristics of the labour market and 
welfare system which could have some influence on childbearing. In section 4 we 
illustrate data, method, and research hypotheses. Results are discussed in section 5. 
Finally, section 6 presents our major findings and concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Economic resources and childbearing: Theoretical background 
The role of the first child in fertility is particularly important in Italy. With the 
increasing postponement of the first birth, fecundity problems or union dissolution 
might occur, leading to an increase in childlessness and a reduction in the final fertility 
level (Livi Bacci 2001). Moreover, the first child has a specific value: most of 
childbearing’s benefits, the realized wish of parenthood, the intrinsic value of children, 
the money support and security in old age, are provided by the first child. Every 
additional child contributes with a decreasing marginal utility to the couples’ utility 
(Mazzuco and Ongaro 2006).  
In developed countries like Italy, childbearing is planned rationally among other 
individual projects, e.g., educational or occupational, so that they interact reciprocally. 
Hence, among the determinants of childbearing, those of an economic nature are 
particularly important. On the one hand the availability of economic resources can 
induce couples to have children, while on the other hand couples can abandon the idea 
of having (more) children if they perceive that the children could negatively influence 
their own economic well-being.  
The key assumption of this work is that individuals pool their economic resources 
and decide rationally to become parents when they can rely on a stable economic basis. 
A solid economic basis is given by enough income to support the household and a good 
degree of job stability. It is clear that individuals can evaluate these two economic 
requisites differently according to their personal values and orientations and the culture 
or the context in which they are embedded.  
The New Home Economics (NHE) hypothesizes that partners manage their 
economic resources to maximize the utility function of goods and services purchased in Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 9 
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the market (Becker 1960, 1965). This function has a budget constraint, the income from 
work, the amount of which varies according to the time spent working and on other 
activities (e.g., eating, sleeping, raising children, etc.). Thus, the crucial problem is how 
to allocate time optimally, so that the function is maximized. This decision is usually 
taken according to the comparative advantage theory, i.e., resources are allocated to 
various activities according to their comparative efficiencies (Becker 1991). Efficient 
households are those with the best division of time and human capital between partners, 
where the partner with the greatest advantage in the market specializes in the market 
and the partner with the greatest advantage in the household specializes in the home. 
The type of family considered in this approach is the classical male breadwinner family, 
where the husband participates in the labour force and the wife devotes her time to 
children and housework. 
This gender specialization is particularly important when partners plan whether 
and when to have children. For Becker (1960), children are consumption goods with a 
given price which provide a given amount of utility. They can be supplied by the 
market and purchased by parents on the basis of their budget constraint, the income 
from work. Rational partners decide how and when to maximize their utility function: 
by consuming more goods or also having more children. Becker (1991) states that 
income is linked to childbearing according to three mechanisms: the income effect, the 
substitution effect, and the price of time effect.  
The income effect is the positive effect of income on consumption: with increasing 
income, consumption of goods and of children increases. Such an effect is positive for 
male income, but it is not clear whether this is so for female income. For female 
income, the income effect interacts with the substitution effect, because the indirect cost 
of children (i.e., forgone incomes, interruptions in working careers, loss of experience 
and earnings, decrease of leisure time, lowering of the couple’s living standards and, 
finally, health costs) increases with increasing female earnings. In classical male 
breadwinner couples, for working women the allocation of time between work and 
family is very difficult. This introduces the price of time effect and the issue of 
conciliation between work and family pressures (Becker 1965). 
The price of time effect dominates the income effect among women, and the 
reverse holds for men. According to the supply-demand microeconomic theory, if 
household income increases, the demand for goods increases as well. The same should 
happen with children. If the rising income is that of the woman, the effect on the 
demand for children can be the opposite, because the relative cost of children is 
significantly affected by changes in the value of the woman’s time, which is most of her 
total indirect cost of childbearing (Becker 1960, 1991).  
Becker (1991) relates changes in fertility levels in modern societies to the 
improvement of women’s socioeconomic status. For well-educated and working women Santarelli: Economic resources and the first child in Italy: A focus on income and job stability 
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both the time and opportunity costs of childbearing are very high. However, in 
countries with an egalitarian family system men participate in home duties, thus 
reducing the price of time effect for women (Liefbroer and Corijn 1999). Therefore, 
from this point of view the NHE’s approach is not exhaustive, as the wider range of 
opportunities for women can influence men’s role and change the gender relation within 
the couple (Oppenheimer 1994). Moreover, families dissolving traditional gender 
boundaries are more adaptive in actual societies (Mencarini 2007). On the contrary, in 
traditional settings men’s contribution to household activities is scarce and the NHE’s 
assumption holds.  
The NHE approach to fertility does not explicitly include uncertainty, because it 
relies on the assumption of a perfect market. According to Mills and Blossfeld (2005), 
job instability is mostly due to the processes of liberalization and globalization that 
provoke market deregulation and increased flexibility, and enhance barriers between 
insiders and outsiders. The progressive liberalization of the labour market is weakening 
labour protection and making long term choices - such as investing in housing, forming 
a union, reaching parenthood - more difficult (Simò and Golsch 2000). The 
globalization process is currently introducing important constraints in individual lives, 
especially among the youngest. They have many difficulties in entering the job market, 
thus limiting their career development. This is particularly true for highly educated and 
skilled individuals, so that their future expectations and projects are stymied by the job 
market (Deriu 2008). It is hypothesized that parenthood is decided when a “relatively 
good” position in the labour market is reached (Mills and Blossfeld 2005). Simò and 
Golsch (2000) state that market uncertainty is a source of frustration for young people, 
so adding a constraint to their decisions. They perceive themselves as not being able to 
guarantee to their future children the standard of living they inherited from their 
parents. 
This does not mean that only economic considerations are involved in the decision 
to have a child. Rather, achieving a minimal level of economic independence and 
security may be regarded as a “necessary but insufficient” condition to be fulfilled 
before childbearing (Bernardi and Nazio 2001:2). As a consequence, the youngest 
develop different rational strategies against uncertainty, e.g., remaining in education, 
postponing family formation, taking on multiple roles, or having children. In male 
breadwinner societies such strategies differ by gender. Men usually opt to postpone 
family formation and fatherhood, while women have two choices: low educated 
women, with scarce prospects of successful careers, tend to marry and have children to 
reduce uncertainty (Friedman, Hechter, and Kanazawa 1994), while highly skilled 
women postpone union formation and motherhood until they have achieved a stable 
position in the labour market (Mills and Blossfeld 2005). Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 9 
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In uncertain contexts the male breadwinner model might not be perceived as a 
solution, and both partners might prefer to be employed and invest many years in 
accumulating human and economic capital to reduce future adversity. Consequently the 
rising female labour market participation can be seen as a strategy to cope with growing 
uncertainty (Oppenheimer 1994).  
Research is not consolidated on whether and how fixed-term contracts affect the 
decision to get married and have children in Italy. However, some empirical studies 
(see e.g., Bernardi and Nazio 2001) show that economic insecurity makes the decision 
to have a first child less likely. In this work we expect that the massive introduction of 
short-term contracts did play a role in first birth choice at the end of last century and 
decreased the probability of couples becoming parents. 
Whether and when individuals take childbearing decisions depend not only on 
their own preference structure, but also on the country-specific institutional context 
(Neyer 2006). Welfare mechanisms can reduce risks by decreasing family expenses or 
child-care time with financial support or childhood services, etc. Institutions can protect 
young people from uncertainty or unemployment with unemployment benefits, 
education grants, and housing subsidies. If welfare support is scarce the family is the 
only institution that helps young couples by transferring money, taking care of children, 
and capital saving. This is the subject of the next section. 
 
 
3. The economic situation of young people in Italy: An overview 
In Italy the labour market and the welfare system design make it difficult for young 
people to reach adulthood and the family is often the only support against their 
economic constraints. In spite of recent changes towards flexibility, the Italian labour 
market still remains highly regulated. Strict rules apply about hiring and firing workers 
and the types of employment arrangements. The Italian job market is characterized by 
long-term unemployment, low rates of mobility, and high insecurity. It presents a strong 
dichotomy between the insiders, i.e., the older cohorts who profit from strong 
employment protection, and the outsiders, i.e., the younger cohorts characterized by 
unemployment and unstable jobs (Pisati and Schizzerotto 2006).  
Labour market instability began to spread at the end of the 1980s, due to a growing 
number of fixed-term contracts mostly restricted to young people, in particular highly 
skilled ones. The highly educated face unfavourable matches in the labour market and 
most of them remain under-exploited (Pisati and Schizzerotto 2006). In particular, in 
1997 the “Treu package” introduced many kinds of fixed-time positions: co.co.co  - 
contracts for temporary collaborations, co.co.pro - contracts to collaborate on projects 
paid according to output, and often unpaid internships. These new employment forms Santarelli: Economic resources and the first child in Italy: A focus on income and job stability 
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are not adequately paid and are often irregular. Atypical workers are not properly 
protected with social contributions and against job loss. These new employment forms 
can be seen as part of organizational restructuring induced by the globalization process. 
On the one hand, they can be a way to off-set strict employment regulations and achieve 
more flexibility, and on the other hand, they indicate the increase of economic 
insecurity that pervades many aspects of life (Bernardi and Nazio 2001). Short-term 
jobs are not an efficient way to enter the labour market and do not rapidly turn into 
stable jobs. Furthermore, there has never been a national minimum income scheme and 
tax deductions are extremely low (Del Boca, Pasqua, and Pronzato 2005).  
In addition, the Italian job market is highly sex-segregated and disparities are 
usually against women. Women’s careers are more occasional than men’s and women 
are paid less, and if they lose their jobs they are more likely than men to remain 
unemployed (Istat 2009b). Self-employed women and atypical workers are still poorly 
protected. Highly protective regulation of maternity leave has made female labour more 
costly than male labour, thus reducing the incentive for employers to hire women. 
Employers prefer men because they are less expensive (they do not receive maternity 
benefits) and are more likely to work overtime (Del Boca 2002).  
Growing female labour market participation compels women to combine the roles 
of worker and mother, while institutions do not provide appropriate reconciliation 
instruments. Temporarily quitting their job should be a solution for women, but this 
implies loss of earnings, experience, and skills, besides the risk of not re-entering the 
market, especially in the private sector. Furthermore, as shown by Davies and Joshi 
(1994), forgone earnings are higher in countries like Italy where female labour market 
participation is lower. Therefore for a woman it may be optimal to delay motherhood 
until she has completed education,  found a stable job, and her opportunity costs are the 
lowest.  
Many studies show that the scarce availability of affordable child care services, the 
rigidity of the labour market, and the limited number of part-time jobs lead to a negative 
relation between female labour market participation and fertility in Italy at the 
individual level (see e.g., Del Boca, Pasqua, and Pronzato 2005; Rondinelli, Aassve, 
and Billari 2010). Such a result might also be the indicator of traditional gender roles 
within the couple. In more traditional settings women’s time is entirely devoted to the 
family and men’s time to the market. Welfare policies can promote an equal distribution 
of unpaid housework between men and women by levelling working perspectives and 
earnings in the market and duties in the family (Neyer 2006). Although women’s 
preferences have started to change, a negative normative climate still persists in Italy 
and the change has not yet led to a general attitudinal shift. The traditional male 
breadwinner model was, and still is, strongly supported by relatively generous social 
insurance schemes and strict labour market regulations. However, its sustainability is Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 9 
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becoming increasingly difficult as the number of dual-earner couples rises. In such a 
situation parents constitute for the youngest a defensive “shield” against the general 
uncertainties of their future. It is mainly the family and kinship networks that give 
support to young people: they are universal institutions which support individuals from 
birth to adulthood. Because of the lack of adequate social policies, young Italians delay 
the nest-leaving and other family formation phases. Furthermore, reaching adulthood 
does not necessarily imply the end of support from the family to young adults. In fact 
the period in which individuals rely on family has been extended to adulthood and even 
beyond (Santarelli and Cottone 2009). This certainly has an important role in 
childbearing decisions. 
What has been described so far shows that in Italy little is done by institutions to 
support fertility decisions. If combining motherhood and work was made easier by the 
welfare system and the labour market, a high female income could foster fertility. 
Whether and how couples’ economic resources are associated with childbearing is 
highly dependent on women’s presence in the labour market and on the extent to which 
family policies, the labour market, and culture alleviate the burden of childrearing 
(Neyer 2006).  
 
 
4. Data, methods, and research hypotheses 
In this work we think in terms of spouses’ life-course strategies that are continuously 
being updated, as partners are faced with a dynamic system of choices, restrictions, and 
chance outcomes. Such strategies produce interactions between partners’ educational 
and job careers on the one hand, and their family histories on the other. For this reason 
we use a couple approach and analyse a sample of childless couples drawn from the 
ECHP. 
The ECHP is a prospective survey with information on labour, income, and 
fertility histories. The panel coves eight years (1994 to 2001), a sufficiently long period 
to study reproductive events. The ECHP provides data on several household and 
individual features and it allows for the reconstruction of precise educational 
attainment, as well as employment and marital and reproductive careers. Its 
multidimensional and multipurpose nature makes possible the study of changes in the 
socioeconomic status, life events, behaviours, and values of individuals and households, 
and of how such changes interact.  
In this work we restrict the analyses to married couples. In fact the onset of the 
couple’s risk of having a first child is usually the start of the union, but this information Santarelli: Economic resources and the first child in Italy: A focus on income and job stability 
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is not available for cohabiting couples in the ECHP
4. However, since unmarried 
parenthood is still rare in Italy, we capture the large majority of births. We exclude 
couples who live with children born from previous unions or with other adults (e.g. 
spouses’ parents), because they could provide economic support to households and 
invalidate the key assumption of section 2. The process time is the duration of the 
marriage. Couples are followed from the second wave of the survey
5 (1995) (spell data 
are left-truncated) up to the first conception
6 if it happens, or the last interview if the 
event does not happen. Couples are censored if the woman reaches 45 years (it is very 
unlikely for women over 45 to become pregnant for the first time), if the marriage 
dissolves, if someone enters the family (e.g. if the spouses’ parents move in), or at last 
interview; whichever comes first.  
We take into account that analyzing married couples makes the sample a selected 
group with respect to childbearing choices. In fact, those who are economically unstable 
may cohabit, delay marriage, or choose not to marry at all (Mills and Blossfeld 2005). 
People who marry usually have a higher family orientation than single people or 
individuals in consensual unions, and therefore a higher propensity to have children 
(Baizan, Aassve and Billari 2003). Among dual earner couples the woman’s labour 
force status and income can be linked to marriage dissolution before parenthood, so 
there could be endogeneity between processes, which can bias the results. In our models 
we do not control for endogeneity, so we do not indicate a direction of causality which 
runs from the covariates to fertility, but just identify patterns of association between 
couples’ economic resources and the risk of first conception. We take into account all 
these issues in the comments on the results.  
Our sample comprises 726 couples. 354 of them, 48.8% of the total, had a first 
child during the seven-year panel (see Appendix Table A1 for some statistics). Since 
they are followed for seven waves, this is not an indication of final fertility levels, but 
only of transitions occurred during the observation window. 
The analysis is performed with a Cox model, i.e., the baseline hazard is given no 
particular parametrization and is left unspecified (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1995). All 
covariates included in the model are time-varying in order to evaluate the effect of 
occupational and economic changes over time. All variables are surveyed annually, so 
we do not know whether and how their value changed during each year. We assume 
that covariates are fixed until the next interview. 
 
4 In all waves of ECHP cohabiting couples are always less than 3%. 
5 In the first wave of ECHP (1994) data on the type of contract are not collected. 
6 As in many empirical studies (e.g. Baizan 2007; Kreyenfeld 2004), the event is nine months before birth to: 
i) study the impact of economic resources on the decision to conceive the first child and ii) to avoid reverse 
causation.  Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 9 
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Concerning individual characteristics, we first consider the woman’s age, because 
the rate of entry into motherhood shows a strong age-dependent pattern. We expect that 
it is negatively associated with the rate of the first child, because childbearing mainly 
depends on woman’s fecundity, which diminishes with age. We include the man’s age 
as well and expect that it does not influence the risk of a first child, because 
childbearing is more related to the woman’s life course than the man’s. 
Among economic resources we firstly take into account the spouses’ education, 
because it is a kind of human capital (Becker 1964). The NHE argues that a high 
education results in higher opportunity costs of childbearing, especially for mothers, 
because they get lower rewards for their schooling investment. This implies that fertility 
decreases quite sharply with increasing education (Becker 1960). Hence, we expect that 
couples with highly educated spouses have a lower first child risk than others.  
As far as the couple’s working status is concerned, we include the couple’s 
employment arrangement as either single or dual earner. In 1995 about 46% of couples 
in our sample are dual earner, while the remainder are mostly single earners where the 
woman is not working (see Table 1). Furthermore, across waves not less than 80% of 
women in one-income couples are housewives and therefore economically inactive. We 
argue that their choice not to work could largely depend on their high family 
orientation. We expect that male breadwinner couples have a higher propensity for 
children than dual earners couples. Women who are not working do not face 
conciliation problems and do not bear indirect costs. In dual earner couples opportunity 
costs could be so high that women prefer to postpone the first conception (Livi Bacci 
2001). In a context like Italy, where the institutions impose many constraints on the 
simultaneous fulfilment of the roles of mother and worker, the role of opportunity costs 
for working women could be crucial to couples’ fertility choices. 
The first key covariate of our model is income from work. Income is considered 
separately for men and women to evaluate whether different mechanisms by gender are 
at work in the income-fertility link, as discussed in section 2. It is the single annual 
income from work, declared net by respondents, and refers to the year prior to the 
survey. This could be an advantage for our study, since it avoids the reverse effect of 
fertility on labour market participation, especially among women. The man’s income 
from work is divided into three percentile groups (0%-33%, 34%-66%, 67%-100%), 
which we classify as low, medium, and high income. We classify women according to 
their labour market status and income level: housewife, unemployed, working women-
low income, working women-high income. This classification allows us to distinguish 
women by income level and, for women without income, whether they are housewives 
or unemployed, since they could have very different fertility patterns. In general, the 
results of past empirical studies have been ambivalent. Income can affect the timing of 
the first child in different ways. According to the NHE, male income is positively Santarelli: Economic resources and the first child in Italy: A focus on income and job stability 
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linked with fertility, due to a direct income effect, and we expect a similar finding. As 
concerns women’s income, we argue that, among working women, high earnings imply 
a long time spent in education and in search of a stable job. Thus, a long time is taken to 
get enough money to form a new family and enter motherhood. We argue that high 
income women bear high opportunity costs and postpone the first child until costs are 
the lowest. Due to the constraints imposed by the labour market and the lack of 
institutional support, we expect that if woman’s income increases, the first birth risk 
reduces, so that the substitution effect prevails.  
Among financial resources we also consider transfers from the state and from 
private sources. We define social transfers as the sum of unemployment and disability 
benefits, and education, family, and housing related allowances. There are a few studies 
in the literature on how social transfers can act on fertility choices: see, e.g., Giraldo, 
Mazzuco and Michielin (2005), Hoem (2000) and Del Boca, Pasqua and Pronzato 
(2005). The relation can be dual: it could be assumed that spouses receiving low social 
support are in bad economic conditions or have health problems and postpone the first 
birth. Furthermore, couples can be induced not to have children at all, because of the 
low social support. In fact, according to De Santis and Livi Bacci (2001), such couples 
prefer to save money against possible future worsening of their living standards, and 
this could conflict with the decision to have a child. Since in Italy social benefits are 
very rare and, where present, scarce, they might not have any impact at all.  
We define private transfers as any financial support that the respondent received 
from relatives, friends, or other persons outside the household. To our knowledge no 
empirical studies have been carried out on the impact of private transfers on fertility in 
Italy, mainly because such information is not available in demographic surveys. In this 
study we have the opportunity to evaluate the role of such economic resources, since 
the ECHP provides data on private transfers received by the couple. We assume that 
they can be associated with social transfers and act in a similar way.  
While information on income is very detailed in the ECHP, only one question is 
asked about the type of contract (permanent or temporary), because the survey was not 
specifically designed to investigate employment instability. Consequently in this work 
the impact of unstable jobs is tested with a variable that classifies dependable work as 
permanent and fixed-termed. As an indicator of economic insecurity we have built a 
variable with all the possible combinations of working arrangements according to the 
type of contract (see Table 1). In this work we follow Istat’s guidelines (2009b) and 
define unstable or uncertain jobs as fixed-term subordinate working contracts and full-
time or part-time apprenticeships, as well as atypical or “non standard” contracts, 
scholarships, research and doctorate grants, job on call, job sharing, etc. In the 
definition of such a variable we consider self-employed individuals as working Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 9 
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permanently, because in Italy at the time of the survey they correspond to stable 
positions in the market (Bernardi and Nazio 2001).  
Table 1 shows that in 1995 most couples in our sample were male breadwinner 
with the man permanently employed (43.7%), while 40.58% were dual earner couples 
with both spouses working permanently. Other couples do not have standard working 
arrangements. We interpret these figures, in line with Billari and Ongaro (1998), as the 
fact that in Italy people marry after at least one partner, usually the man, has found a 
stable job. We argue that one-income couples with the man permanently employed 
encounter the highest first child rates, because they have a stable income and non- 
working women do not have indirect costs. We expect that couples with both spouses 
permanently employed have the next highest risk, while couples where one or both 
partners are unemployed or economically unstable have the lowest first birth rates. In 
fact, individuals with fixed-term contracts are forced to continuously redefine their 
choices and to postpone parenthood until they are stable. They are less protected 
regarding the access to conciliation measures, such as parental leave. Again, having a 
child may interfere with the chances of obtaining more stable employment, and, more 
generally, with getting established on a career track.  
Then we include the area of residence: North, Centre, South, and Islands. This is a 
time-varying variable, so that we can take into account residential changes over time. 
The area of residence is the only variable possibly expressing contextual characteristics: 
differences in the rate of first conception by place of residence could express the 
influence of macro unobserved factors such as labour market and cultural and 
institutional settings. In fact many empirical studies show that in Italy local 
socioeconomic, institutional, and cultural backgrounds are prominent elements 
influencing childbearing (see, e.g., Dalla Zuanna and Righi 1999). The North and 
Centre record higher educational attainment and female labour market participation 
than the South, as well as a more flexible labour market (more part time job 
availability) and modern family behaviours (living alone before marriage, a large 
number of consensual unions). They also register a later transition to marriage than the 
South (Billari and Ongaro 1998). As a consequence, we expect that couples in the North 
and Centre have a lower first child risk than Southern couples.  
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Table 1:  Married couples by partners’ employment arrangement and type of 




permanent or  
self-employed 
Woman working: 
temporary or  
without contract 
Man not working  4.46 0.64  1.78 
Man working: permanent or 
self-employed 43.70  40.58  3.57 
Man working: temporary or 
without contract  3.27  1.23  0.68 
 




In this section we present the results of the Cox model on the link between a couple’s 
economic resources and instability and entry into parenthood. They are shown in Table 
2, where three models are presented (A, B, and C). 
In model A we include the following covariates: woman’s age and educational 
attainment, couples’ employment arrangement, and area of residence. The effect of 
female age takes a bell-shaped form, but parameter estimates are not always significant 
(except in model B). Also the man’s age is not significantly linked with first child rate 
and we decide not to include this covariate in the final model. 
Results for education show that women’s school level is not significantly 
associated with the transition to first birth during the studied period. This result could 
be surprising compared to the majority of empirical findings. According to many 
authors (see, e.g., Bratti (2003) and Ongaro and Salvini (2003)) education is negatively 
associated with first child risks and this usually reflects the fertility postponement of the 
better educated women. We argue that our result can be due to the fact that we focus on 
married couples. Very educated women marry later, but when they marry they probably 
have the same birth rate as less educated women. Male education is also not significant 
and we do not include it in the final model A.  
Results on the couple’s employment arrangement clearly show that single earner 
couples have a 33% higher first birth risk than dual earner couples. Such a result is 
consistent with other empirical studies showing that in Italy couples with non-working 
women have higher first birth risks, probably because they anticipate the first child 
(Baizan 2007; Vignoli and Salvini 2008). The majority of Italian married couples want 
to have children (Castagnaro and Di Priamo 2003), so the most important difference Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 9 
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among them is on the timing of the first birth. Childbearing is very costly for employed 
mothers, so that after marriage they postpone their first child to limit indirect costs.  
Estimates on the area of residence are not significant, indicating that residing in the 
North, Centre, or South does not distinguish couples in their transition to first birth. 
Hence, there is no evidence that institutional or cultural effects are responsible for the 
postponement of maternity at the turn of the twentieth century. We interpret this finding 
in line with Mazzuco and Ongaro (2006), i.e., the first childbirth is a "special" choice, 
highly desired by married couples, independently of economic, cultural, and 
institutional conditions, notwithstanding their large differences across Italy.  
 
Table 2:  Relative risks of first child of childless married couples in Italy 
(month of conception), 1995-2001 
 
     Model A  Model B  Model C 
up to 24 (ref.)   1  1  1 
25-29   1.20  1.17  1.31 
30-34   1.15  1.15  1.30 
35-39   0.61  0.56*  0.63 
Woman’s age  
40-45   0.48  0.44  0.48 
low (ref.)   1    
medium   0.87      Woman’s educational level 
high   0.94     
dual earner (ref.)   1    
Couple’s employment model  
single earner   1.33**    
both permanently employed (ref.)      1 
only man permanently employed      0.82  Couple’s working stability 




low level (ref.)    1  
medium level    1.06   Man’s income from work 
high level    1.06  
housewife (ref.)    1   
unemployed     1.21  
low income     0.67***  
Woman’s labour market 
status 
high income    0.70*  
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Table 2:  (Continued) 
     Model A  Model B  Model C 
No (ref.)    1    Couple’s income from  
social transfers  Yes   1.22   
No (ref.)    1    Couple’s income from. 
private transfers  Yes   0.89   
North (ref.)   1  1  1 
Centre   1.06  1.05  1.09  Area of residence 
South   1.18  1.21  1.20 
Log-L    -1636.987 -1764.159 -1417.257 
 
Source: own elaboration on ECHP data. 
Note: *=p<0.10, **=p<0.05, ***=<0.01. 
 
Model B includes covariates on the woman’s age, male income, female labour 
market status, other sources of income, and area of residence. Firstly, we found the 
unexpected result that the man’s income is not significantly linked with fatherhood. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, the choice to have the first child appears to be irrespective 
of the male income level. 
Secondly, we find that women who have a labour income have much lower first 
birth rates than non-working women. Among working women a high income makes the 
first child risk slightly higher than a low income. We interpret this result in line with the 
opportunity costs theory. Employed wives postpone motherhood, because an exit from 
the market could damage their skills and future labour market prospects. In fact, higher 
depreciation of human capital during their absence for maternity corresponds to lower 
wages in the future. This aspect is very important in Italy, where women’s participation 
is low and childbearing costs are high, unless specific measures are taken to improve 
the compatibility of employment and childbearing (Davies and Joshi 1994).  
Concerning other types of income, our estimates reveal that incomes from social 
and private transfers are not significantly associated with first birth propensity. This 
result supports our hypotheses and it is explained by the low amount of such benefits.  
Finally, the area of residence is not significantly linked with parenthood. 
In model C we test couples’ job stability as the main covariate. A surprising result 
is that the level of job stability is not significantly associated with parenthood during 
the years under study, and we argue that this comes from the fact that a large majority 
of the selected couples are permanently employed. We interpret this as one of the 
consequence of analyzing married couples: due to the difficulties of entering the 
market, young people in Italy marry only after at least one partner has found a stable 
job to support the newly formed family (Billari and Ongaro 1998). This is usually the Demographic Research: Volume 25, Article 9 
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case for men: the stability of future income streams is a crucial factor in enabling them 




The weak connection between the educational system and the labour market, and the 
rigidity of the job market and the inefficiency of the welfare state, make transition to 
adulthood increasingly difficult for young Italians. Such elements have made, and still 
are making, changes in economic and social life faster and less predictable. Job and 
income insecurity lead young people to choices other than union formation and 
parenthood, because they are not compatible with the instability of their working status. 
A sense of insecurity about economic resources has been spreading since the end of the 
1980s, especially among the youngest, due to labour reforms that introduced many 
kinds of temporary jobs. This certainly has consequences for individual family and 
fertility plans.  
In this work we analyzed whether and how economic resources, in particular 
income and job stability, are linked to first parenthood in Italy at the end of the 
twentieth century. Such studies are quite infrequent, mostly due to the shortage in 
demographic surveys of longitudinal data on income and type of contract. Using data 
from the ECHP, we studied the transition to parenthood of a sample of married couples 
in association with covariates on education, income, and various job characteristics, 
during the period 1995-2001. This study constitutes an important contribution to the 
scarce literature on the link between economic circumstances and fertility in Italy. We 
employed a couple approach to take into account the interconnections between spouses’ 
labour force status and economic resources. 
Our findings show that the employment arrangement significantly differentiates 
married couples in their transition to parenthood. In particular, male breadwinner 
couples have their first child earlier than dual earner couples. Very interesting results 
are obtained on the link between income and first child risk: firstly, male earnings are 
not significantly associated with first parenthood; secondly, women who have an 
income have much lower first births rate than non-working women. Furthermore, 
among working women those with higher earnings encounter a slightly higher first birth 
risk than low income women. Our analyses show that other kinds of income (transfers 
from the state and from private sources) do not matter for first birth decisions either. 
We interpret these results in the light of the specific features of the cultural and 
institutional Italian context. We argue that at the end of the last century the persistence 
of the male breadwinner model makes the stability of the man’s employment position a 
necessary requisite for having a first child, regardless of the income level. For women Santarelli: Economic resources and the first child in Italy: A focus on income and job stability 
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the main difference in the transition to motherhood seems to be between working and 
non-working women. When looking at the role of employment careers from a couple-
level interaction, the woman’s position in the labour market plays a key role in the 
transition to parenthood. Due to the persistence of traditional gender roles within the 
family and high constraints from the labour market, working women’s childbearing 
decisions are conditioned by many constraints. A great degree of incompatibility 
between family and work still persists and little has been done by institutions in recent 
years to make the conciliation easier. 
Another interesting result of our study is that the degree of job stability is not 
linked to the entry into parenthood, and we interpret this as a consequence of analyzing 
married couples. This result does not imply that job stability does not matter in the 
transition to parenthood. We argue that it indirectly influences parenthood by delaying 
union formation: results by Bernardi and Nazio (2001) and Billari and Rosina (2004) 
show that job precariousness has a negative influence on union formation and marriage 
both for women and for men. Hence, income and job stability should also be analyzed 
in connection with union formation: comparing the results of the transition to marriage 
or cohabitation and to parenthood may show in which phase of the transition to 
adulthood economic instability is effective, and how. 
This work adds new insights to the research on economic resources and fertility in 
Italy, which so far has been limited due to a lack of suitable data. Firstly, the ECHP 
provides rich employment data and allows the inclusion in the analyses of different 
kinds of income, which is an important element in childbearing decisions. Secondly, the 
ECHP allows the adoption of a couple approach in order to shed light on the 
interrelations between the economic prospects and careers of both spouses. In 
particular, it allows the examination of how partners’ characteristics can interact to 
diminish or neutralize economic uncertainties. We recommend that features of both 
partners are included when planning social surveys, so that how they interact 
reciprocally to cancel out economic constraints can be explored.  
This study certainly has some limitations. One of these is that it only focuses on 
married couples and this makes our sample a selected group with respect to fertility 
decisions. A further limitation is the small sample size. As pointed out in section 4, 
these shortcomings are due to the design of ECHP, which, however, is the only survey 
currently available in Italy to study economic resources and parenthood at the end of the 
twentieth century from a couple perspective.  
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Appendix 
Table A1:  Progression to first birth in Italy: Exposures and events in the  
study population 
  Number of couples:  726   





Covariates    Abs. values %  Abs. values  % 
up to 24   2,013  11.2  56  15.8 
25-29   7,824  43.3  168  47.5 
30-34   5,645  31.3  110  31.1 
35-39   2,492  13.8  16  4.5 
Woman’s age  
40-45   77  0.4  4  1.1 
low   2,115  11.7  44  12.4 
medium   10,017  55.5  183  51.7 
Woman’s 
educational level 
high   5,919  32.8  127  35.9 
dual earner    12,943  71,7  224  63.3  Couple’s 
employment model   single earner   5,108  28,3  130  36.7 
both permanently employed    4,399  24.4  98  27.8 
only man permanently employed  10,852  60.1  191  54.0 
Couple’s  
working stability 
not standard working arrangements 2,800  15.5  65  18.2 
low level   6,630 36.8  142  40.1 
medium level  6,614  36.6  125  35.3 
Man’s  
income from work 
high level  4,807  26.6  87  24.6 
housewife 3,799  21.0  95  26.8 
unemployed 1,958  10.8  45  12.7 
low income  6,296  35.0  117  33.1 
Woman’s  
labour market status 
high income  5,998  33.2  97  27.4 
no   16,344  90.5  321  90.7  Couple’s income 
from social transfers  yes 1,707  9.5  33  9.3 
no   16,817  93.2  331  93.5  Couple’s income 
from private transfers yes 1,234  6.8  23  6.5 
North    8,555  47.4  140  39.6 
Centre   2,733  15.1  51  14.4  Area of residence 
South   6,763  37.5  163  46.0 
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